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Abstract: Accounting instructors often introduce analytical procedures (APs) to students as a 
series of techniques that help to reduce audit time and cost. However, they do not generally 
provide students with sufficient real-world cases that encourage students to use data from 
multiple sources, exercise judgment, and evaluate risks. This paper uses MiniScribe Corpora- 
tion to illustrate how a real-world case might be incorporated into an auditing class to achieve 
some of the recommendations of the Accounting Education Change Commission and, at the 
same time, highlight the efficiency and effectiveness of APs. The case also reinforces the joint 
importance of qualitative and quantitative factors in detecting management fraud. 
Recently, several accounting educators and practitioners have expressed 
concern about the content and process of accounting education (Arthur 
Andersen & Co. et al., 1989 [the “Big-Eight White Paper”]; Dugan, Gup, & 
Samson, 1991; Inman, Wengler, & Wickert, 1989; Mohr, 1991). Among the 
concerns of these critics is that students entering the profession are ill- 
prepared to use data, exercise judgment, evaluate risks, and solve real- 
world problems. The Accounting Education Change Commission has stim- 
ulated a considerable amount of discussion relating to the deficiencies in 
accounting education and has proposed alternatives for redressing the situa- 
tion. In its recent position paper. Objectives of Education for Accountants 
(1990), the Commission recommends that: 
Students must be active participants in the learning process, not passive recipi- 
ents of information. They should identify and solve unstructured problems 
that require use of multiple information sources. . . . Teaching methods that 
expand and reinforce basic communication, intellectual, and interpersonal 
skills should be used. (p. 5) 
The teaching of analytical procedures (APs) in the auditing course is an 
area in accounting education that is subject to the criticisms listed above. 
This paper presents a real-world case, MiniScribe Corporation, that may be 
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used to supplement instruction in the area of analytical procedures and risk 
assessment. The case helps to address many of the deficiencies and criti- 
cisms highlighted above, and at the same time, exposes students to issues 
relating to the efficiency and effectiveness of APs in signaling the existence 
of fraud. Some instructors may also find the case useful in discussing ethics. 
However, the focus of this presentation is on analytical procedures. 
The teaching notes and analysis that accompany the case use a tandem 
approach that emphasizes both qualitative and quantitative factors in the 
analytical review process. This approach emphasizes signals derived from 
both quantitative APs and the qualitative environmental factors that sup- 
port the interpretation of these signals. Since the approach requires a sys- 
tematic and comprehensive evaluation of both quantitative and qualitative 
factors, it results in a more complete consideration of red flags in an audit 
situation. Use of a tandem approach in teaching APs is consistent with SAS 
No. 56 (AICPA, 1989), which requires auditors to use both quantitative 
and qualitative analytical procedures. Real-world cases that involve compa- 
nies in which management fraud has actually taken place represent an in- 
valuable resource for implementing the tandem approach. The case pre- 
sented in this paper, MiniScribe Corporation, illustrates how such cases 
might be incorporated into the auditing class to highlight the utility of APs, 
and helps in fostering the “active participant” role of accounting students. 
The next section of the paper describes the MiniScribe case. A subsequent 
section, Teaching Notes, details the case requirements, briefly reviews the 
conceptual and authoritative background for the tandem approach, and 
presents the analysis. Details of the actual fraud are also presented. The 
analysis focuses on the sales, accounts receivable, and inventory accounts 
since most management frauds involve these areas (Loebbecke, Eining, 8~ 
Willingham, 1989). 
THE MINISCRIBE CASE 
Prior to 1985, MiniScribe Corporation (CUSIP #6603669; SIC #3572), ’ a 
manufacturer of computer disk drives, had sustained a series of losses. 
Contributing to those losses were the company’s huge investments in re- 
search and development, and the start-up of a new plant in Singapore. The 
net loss for fiscal year 1984 exceeded $5.7 million. The losses for the first 
and second quarters of 1985 were $12.5 million and $7.1 million, respec- 
tively. The disk drive industry was plagued with major employee layoffs 
during that period. MiniScribe had reduced its own workforce by 26% in 
1984, and the company dismissed another 450 employees in 1985. Other 
disk drive producers, including Onyx & IMI, Priam, and Seagate Technol- 
‘The details about MiniScribe Corporation were obtained from the company’s annual report, 
the company’s IO-K, and other documents filed with the SEC. 
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ogy, were also experiencing similar economic stress. Even with the industry 
facing losses and layoffs, survivors were beginning to emerge. 
In May of 1985, an investor group led by Hambrecht & Quist (H&Q) 
provided a $20 million capital infusion into the company. As part of the 
new investment deal, Q. T. Wiles, who was the chairman of H&Q, became 
the chairman of MiniScribe. Immediately thereafter, he restructured the 
company’s senior management. As part of his restructuring efforts, Mr. 
Wiles divided the company into about two dozen profit centers. The com- 
position of those profit centers, however, changed often-almost quar- 
terly-because of internal conflict. Mr. Wiles managed the company from 
his offiees in California. All other management operations were headquar- 
tered in Colorado. 
Mr. Wiles was a well-known figure in industry. Because of his history of 
taking and revitalizing ailing companies, he was popularly referred to as 
“Dr. Fix-it.” He was known for his forceful, target-oriented approach to 
m~agern~~t. After taking over MiniScribe~ Mr. Wiles held quarterly man- 
agement meetings in which he emphasized the need to set high targets and 
to achieve them. Each manager was required to set quarterly financial goals 
which became the basis for their performance evaluation and compensa- 
tion In many instances, achievement of those quarterly financial goals was 
the only basis for compensation. Meetings were regulariy used as a forum 
to reprimand nonperformi~g managers and on occasions, managers were 
actualliy fired at these meetings. 
Each profit center at MiniScribe had its own financial staff who reported 
to the corporate controller. Profit centers were generally responsible for 
profits and day-to-day financial control. The corporate controller’s office 
was primarily responsible for consolidating the financial reports and for 
compiling financial statements. Financial statements were compiled from 
information supplied by the various profit centers. The financial staff in 
the profit centers were generally poorly trained. 
The company did not have an internal audit department, although the 
external auditors had recommended one. An audit committee of the board 
of directors was established in 1985. Primary functions of the committee 
included (1) to recommend the external auditors and to evaIuate the scope 
of their work, and (2) to review the adequacy of financial control and 
financial management. The committee consisted of three members, all of 
whom had been employed in various capacities, at one time or another, in 
the investment banking activities of the company. The committee met, on 
average, no more than once a year. 
MiniScribe’s financial statements indicated a recovery in the third quarter 
of 1985, posting a net income of $329,000. This was the beginning of 13 
consecutive quarters of record-breaking earnings. During that period, sales 
increased almost exponentially, and the firm’s stock price quintupled. By 
1987, MiniScribe was recognized in the financial press as the fastest- 
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growing firm in its industry. The following excerpts from the company’s 
1986 and 1987 annual reports document the company’s successes: 
The company’s 1986 results reflect a continuation of the recovery that began 
in the third quarter of 1985. Net sales increased 62% from 1985 to 1986. This 
increase was primarily due to the general recovery in the microcomputer 
industry which began in the third quarter of 1985, coupled with the market 
acceptance of the company’s families of 3-l/2 inch full-height and 5-s inch 
half-height disk drives, and its full 5-s inch full-height, high capacity drives 
(MiniScribe Corp, Annual Report, 1986). 
Most of the company’s sales growth during the first half of 1986 was 
attributable to the company’s 5-“/a inch full-height, high capacity drives, 
which entered volume production in the second quarter of 1985 (MiniScribe 
Corp, Annual Report, 1986). 
Sales of 3-s inch drives increased significantly in 1986, reflecting strong 
demand for an existing base of OEM customers, as well as the introduction in 
late 1986 of two new models: a 3-s inch drive with an SCSI interface and the 
ScribeCard (MiniScribe Corp, Annual Report, 1986). 
The company ended the 1987 fiscal year in a strong financial position. 
Working capital increased to $118,073,000 from %53,451,000 in 1986, and 
cash and cash equivalents tripled to $48,956,000 (MiniScribe Corp, Annual 
Report, 1987). 
In May 1987, the company issued $97,750,000 principal amount of 7-s % 
convertible subordinated debentures due 2012 resulting in net proceeds to the 
company of $95,061,875 net of underwriting discounts and commissions. The 
net proceeds are being used principally to fund increases in inventories and 
accounts receivable and to acquire capital equipment and to expand capacity. 
A portion of the proceeds were used to repay the full borrowings of 
$24,957,000 that were outstanding under the collateralized $25,000,000 bank 
credit facility (MiniScribe Corp, Annual Report, 1987). 
The company is planning to spend $28,000,000 on capital expenditures in 
1988. These expenditures are expected to be funded through internally gener- 
ated funds and existing bank lines of credit. As of January 3, 1988 the com- 
pany had no debt outstanding under its $25,000,000 line of credit agreement 
and approximately $875,000 under an equipment financing agreement (Mini- 
Scribe Corp, Annual Report, 1987). 
The auditors had rendered unqualified opinions for the prior years’ 
audited financial statements. Comparative summary income statement and 
balance sheet information for the years 1982 to 1987 are presented in Tables 
1 and 2. 
Possible Questions 2 
1. Using the data presented in the case, develop appropriate materiality 
thresholds for 1986 and 1987. Consider only sales, accounts receiv- 
able, and inventory accounts. 
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2. Calculate expected account balances for 1986 and 1987, compare the 
expected amounts you computed with the balances reported in Mini- 
Scribe’s financial statements and evaluate the differences. Compare 
the ratios and trends evident in MiniScribe’s financial statements for 
1986 and 1987 with industry ratios and trends. Does your analysis 
raise any questions about the validity and reliability of the financial 
statements for 1986 and 1987? 
3. Review the authoritative and the empirical literature, particularly SAS 
No. 53 (AICPA, 1988) and the work of Loebbecke and Willingham 
(Loebbecke et al., 1989; Loebbecke & Willingham, 1988). Develop a 
model to identify and analyze the qualitative red flags in the case. 
Based on the model you have developed, what red flags are evident in 
the case? Do these red flags fuel any skepticism relating to the validity 
and reliability of the reported results for 1986 and 1987. 
4. Integrate the findings of the quantitative and qualitative analyses to 
draw conclusions about the likelihood of errors in the financial state- 
ments of MiniScribe. 
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TEACHING NOTES 
The case may be presented after audit planning is discussed. Prior expo- 
sure to both SAS No. 53 and 56 is required. Class discussions on the 
Treadway Commission’s recommendations (Treadway, 1987), and the 
Loebbecke-Willingham fraud risk assessment model (Loebbecke et al., 
1989; Loebbecke & Wilhngham, 1988) would enhance the student’s ability 
to analyze the case. Both SAS 53 and the Loebbecke-Will~ngham model are 
reviewed below. 
In teaching this case, the analysis is conducted in two stages without 
letting students know that a fraud actually existed. In Stage 1 of the analy- 
sis, students are asked to develop appropriate materiality thresholds, calcu- 
late relevant expectations, and analyze the rest&s for 1986 and 1987. Stu- 
dents are required to obtain, and incorporate into their analysis, relevant 
exogenous information such as industry ratios and trends, and general busi- 
ness conditions, En the Stage 2, students are asked to conduct a qualitative 
evaluation of the case using SAS 53 and the Loebbecke-Willingham fraud 
risk assessment model. Students are then asked to consider their evaluation 
of the quantitative and qualitative factors in tandem and to assess the risk 
of management fraud. 3 
The remainder of this section reviews the tandem approach, including a 
discussion of the Loebbecke-Willingham model and SAS 53, and presents 
the qu~titative and qualitative analyses. Aspects of the actual fraud that 
would be of interest in discussing the case in an auditing class are also 
detailed. 
The Tandem Approach 
APs have long been used to produce audit evidence. Over half a century 
ago, auditors used “scanning” as an analytical procedure. At that time, 
auditors believed that simply scanning a client’s financial statements was 
sufficient to detect risk areas. A 1934 editorial in the Accounting Review 
(Editorial, 1934, p. 257), for example, notes that ‘Yhere are accountants 
who can barely glance at a balance sheet and come away with a good many 
significant facts in their minds.” Today, as then, APs are used to reduce 
both audit time and cost. Recently, the focus on APs has shifted from using 
APs for audit efficiency to using them to enhance audit effectiveness. This 
change in focus resulted primarily from the 1987 Treadway Commission 
Report (p. 13), which called for changes in Generally Accepted Auditing 
Standards (GAAS) so as to “make greater use of analytical review proce- 
dures to identify areas with a high risk of fraudulent financial reporting.” 
Since the release of the Treadway Commission’s report, fraud detection 
analysis has taken two separate tracks, The first approach has examined 
‘Instructors who use this case may consider disguising the names (e.g., the name of the 
corporation, the chief executive, and the product) used in the case to limit hindsight bias, 
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the general effectiveness of quantitative APs in detecting both errors and 
irregularities4 Quantitative APs include such tools as trend analysis, ratio 
analysis, and time series and regression analyses. However, the effective- 
ness of these APs may be compromised by an auditor’s subsequent discus- 
sion with the client. For example, a quantitative procedure may correctly 
signal a management irregularity, but the auditor may choose not to fully 
investigate the signal because subsequent discussion with the client may 
provide a plausible (albeit inaccurate) explanation for it (Kinney, 1987). 
The second approach used in fraud detection analysis focuses on qualita- 
tive factors that may amplify the signals observed by the auditor. Loeb- 
becke and Willingham (1988) pioneered work in this area. They hypothe- 
sized that the probability of a material irregularity is a function of the 
extent to which three factors exist in a particular business situation. These 
factors are (1) conditions allowing the commission of an irregularity (C), 
(2) motivation for the commission of an irregularity (M), and (3) personal 
attitudes allowing the commission of an irregularity (A). If all three factors 
are present, there is a high probability that material management fraud will 
occur. If any of the three factors is missing, then there is less likelihood that 
a management fraud will occur. 
Loebbecke and Willingham (1988) identified (and classified into the three 
categories) 55 “red flags” that may alert the auditor to possible irregularities 
in the client’s financial statements. In a subsequent validation study, Loeb- 
becke, Eining, and Willingham (LEW) (1989) verified that several of the 
proposed red flags would indeed alert auditors to management fraud and 
irregularities. A list of red flags adapted from the LEW validation study is 
presented in Table 3. A similar, though somewhat less comprehensive, list 
of red flags appears in SAS No. 53. This list is categorized into red flags 
relating management characteristics, operating and industry characteristics, 
and engagement characteristics. Table 4 details the red flags in SAS No. 53. 
SAS No. 53 (AU 316.05) requires auditors to design the audit to provide 
reasonable assurance of detecting management fraud. The Statement de- 
fines management fraud as the intentional reporting of misleading financial 
statements. In order to increase the probability of fraud detection, SAS 56 
(AU 329) requires that APs, which consist of quantitative as well as qualita- 
tive analysis, be used in both the planning and review stages of the audit. A 
tandem approach is, therefore, clearly indicated in the standard. 
Using a tandem approach to teach APs, as proposed in this paper, expo- 
‘See, for example, Knechel, 1986, 1988; Coglitore and Berryman, 1988; and Kunitake and 
Glezen, 1987. Analytical Review Procedures,” Decision Sciences (Summer 1986), pp. 376-394; 
W. Knechel, “The Effectiveness of Statistical Analytical Review as a Substantive Auditing 
Procedure: A Simulation Analysis,” The Accounting Review (January, 1988), pp. 74-95; F. 
Coglitore and R. Berryman, “Analytical Procedures: A Defensive Necessity,” Auditing: A 
Journal of Practice and Theory (Spring, 1988), pp. 150-163; and W. Kunitake and G. Glezen, 
“The Use of Analytical Review Procedures and their Effectiveness in Signaling Financial 
Statement Errors,” The Ohio CPA Journal (Summer, 1987), pp. 45-49. 
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Table 3. Qualitative fraud risk assessment model adapted from 
Loebbecke, Eining, and Willingham (1988) 
Primary indicators of C are: 
decisions dominated by a single person or few persons 
major transactions have a material effect on company 
significant related party transactions 
weak internal control environment 
transactions which are difficult to audit 
Secondary indicators of C are: 
material account balances are determined by judgment 
high management turnover 
decentralized organization 
assets subject to misappropriation 
new audit client 
rapid growth of company 
inexperienced management 
conflict of interest within company management 
Primary indicators of M are: 
industry decline 
inadequate profits 
management places undue emphasis on earnings projections 
company is subject to significant contractual commitments 
Secondary indicators of M are: 
rapid growth of company 
rapid industry change 
operating results are sensitive to economic factors 
incentive compensation is based on recorded pe~ormance 
adverse legal circum~ances 
company holdings represent a significant portion of management’s personal wealth 
management’s job threatened by poor performance 
Primary indicators of A are: 
dishonest management 
management places undue emphasis on earnings projections 
prior year irregularities 
management has lied to the auditor or has been evasive 
management has an aggressive attitude toward financial reporting 
personality anomalies 
Secondary indicators of A are: 
weak internal control 
conflict of interest within company management 
poor reputation of management in the business community 
management has frequent disputes with the auditor 
client or management places undue pressure on the auditor 
client or management displays disrespectful attitude 
ses students to the combined strengths of such traditional quantitative pro- 
cedures as trend analysis, ratio analysis and time series modeling, and the 
innovative qualitative procedures suggested by LEW. In addition, present- 
ing this approach to the auditing student is consistent with the recent thrust 
toward quantitative and qualitative procedures that is evident in the author- 
itative literature. 
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Table 4. SAS No. 53 management fraud risk factors 
Management characteristics 
Includes the attitude of management toward financial reporting, the concentration of 
management decision making power, and the reputation of management in the business 
community. Red flags in this category are listed below. 
Management operating and financing decisions are dominated by a single person. 
Management attitude toward financial reporting is unduly aggressive. 
Management . . turnover is high. 
Management places undue emphasis on meeting earnings projections. 
Management’s reputation in the business community is poor. 
Operating and industry characteristics 
Includes the profitability of the firm relative to the industry, the sensitivity of the industry 
to economic changes, and the firm’s ability to continue as a going concern. Red flags in 
this category are listed below. 
Profitability of the entity relative to its industry is inadequate or inconsistent. 
Sensitivity of operating results to economic factors . . is high. 
Rate of change in entity’s industry is rapid. 
Direction of change in entity’s industry is declining with many business failures. 
Organization is decentralized without adequate monitoring. 
Matters that raise substantial doubt about the entity’s ability to continue as a going 
concern are present. 
Engagement characteristics 
Includes the difficulty of the firm to audit, such as related-party transactions, or the firm 
being a new client with no prior audit history. Red flags in this category are listed below. 
Many contentious or difficult accounting issues are present. 
Significant difficult-to-audit transactions or balances are present. 
Significant and unusual related-party transactions not in the ordinary course of busi- 
ness are present. 
Nature, cause (if known), or the amount of known and likely misstatements detected in 
the audit of prior period’s financial statements is significant. 
It is a new client with no prior audit history, or sufficient information is not available 
from the predecessor auditor. 
Quantitative Analysis 
Instructors may use several quantitative methods to compute the audi- 
tor’s expectation. These methods range from simple techniques such as a 
random walk model to sophisticated techniques such as regression and 
advanced time series modeling. If available, a more sophisticated model 
such as Deloitte and Touche’s Statistical Technique for Analytical Review 
(STAR) may be used (Stringer & Stewart, 1986). The MiniScribe case is 
fairly robust to a variety of expectations models. 
One quantitative model that has worked in teaching this case is a martin- 
gale model with a drift factor that is computed using the weighted average 
change method (McKee, 1989). The expected account balance or ratio is 
calculated by summing the prior years’ account balance or ratio and the 
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expected change. 5 This model allows the student to calculate an expected 
change in an account balance or ratio that places more weight on the most 
recent account balances. This is consistent with the assumption that changes 
in account balances or ratios during recent years have more predictive 
power than changes during earlier years (Blocher & Willington, 1985). 
Table 5 presents the auditor’s expectations for 1986 and 1987 computed 
using the martingale model described above. Actual figures for 1986 are 
compared with the expectations calculated using data for the period 1982 
through 1985. Similarly, actual amounts for 1987 are compared with expec- 
tations calculated using data for the period 1982 through 1986. 
After the auditor’s expectations are computed, the student must deter- 
mine which materiality threshold should be used in analyzing the data. 
There are several possible materiality thresholds that may be used in teach- 
ing the case. These range from the simple 5 and 10% materiality rules that 
dominate current practice (Schmutte, 1990) to sophisticated statistical rules 
that have been used in the auditing literature (Kinney, 1978; 1987; Wheeler 
& Pany, 1990). Although the sophisticated decision rules tend to generate 
more precise signals, the simple judgement rules that dominate practice 
appear to result in signals that are reasonably robust (Wilson & Colbert, 
1989). 
Use of a simple 10% materiality threshold has been fairly effective in 
teaching this case. This 10% threshold implies that if the actual amount 
differs from the expected value by 10% or more, the student should con- 
sider expanding substantive testing for that account balance or area. A 
simple 10% materiality level is used in the analysis presented in Table 5. 
‘The weighted average change method uses the following model to compute the auditor’s 
expectation: 
Auditorsexpectation = B, + C(GB,[N - t + I]/[N/2 * {N + l}]) 
where, 
SB, = Change in account balance in year 1. 
B, = Account balance in the year prior to the fraud. 
t = Number of years prior to the fraud. That is 1 = 1, one year prior to the fraud; 1 = 2, 
two years prior to the fraud, etc. 
N = The total number of years in the time series. 
Two other methods were used to calculate the expected account balances. These other methods 
are (1) a simple average expectation model, and (2) last year’s account balance plus or minus 10%. 
All three models resulted in similar signals. The weighted average expectation model, the model 
used in the study, signaled the fewest red flags. The quantitative analysis would have produced 
significantly stronger red flags if either of the other two models were used. 
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Table 5. Quantitative analytical procedures: 
Account balances for 1988 and 1987 
(in thousands of US$) 
Expected Actual Difference Materiality 
1966 
Net sales 


















47.710 2.446’ l 
0.060 0.289 0.229 0.006’ l 
5.91 6.63 0.72 0.59’ l 
29.31 22.78 6.53 2.93* l 
1967 
Net sales 









$226,866 $362,467 $135,801 $22,689* * 
156,044 258,551 102,507 15,604** 
10,317 17,242 6,925 1,032** 
50,152 57,144 6,992 5,015** 
33,893 31,147 2,746 3,389 
0.376 0.287 0.089 0.038* * 
6.44 7.48 1.04 0.64* * 
14.09 20.48 6.39 1.41** 
l *Indicates a significant difference given a materiality level of 10% of the expected account 
balance or ratio. 
With the exception of the 1986 cost of goods sold and the 1987 net 
income, the deviation from each expectation exceeded the 10% threshold. 
For each of the 2 years, the quantitative APs would have acted as a red flag 
in 7 of the 8 account balances or ratios reported in Table 5. These results 
should signal to the student the need to further investigate the causes of 
unexpected changes in the sales, cost of goods sold, accounts receivable, 
and inventory accounts. 
At this point, students are asked to focus on exogenous data and conduct 
an analysis from the perspective of industry and general economic perfor- 
mance. This is particularly important since it adds both depth and breadth 
to the quantitative analysis and helps students assess the plausibility of the 
results obtained from the analysis of endogenous data. A simple graphical 
display of company and industry data is typically very useful. Figure 1, 
which displays the percentage change in net sales of MiniScribe and its 
industry, provides a useful illustration. Several disturbing trends are clearly 
visible from the graph. From the beginning of 1984 through the third quar- 
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Figure 1. Percent change in net sales, firm to industry. 
ter of 1985, MiniScribe’s sales were falling much faster than the general 
decline in the industry. After 1985, however, MiniScribe’s sales increased 
substantially. A similar graph is depicted in Figure 2. It shows a comparison 
between the trend in the percentage change of net income for the firm 
versus the rest of the computer industry. Again, the results subsequent to 
the arrival of Q. T. Wiles in late 1985 show a marked improvement that 
was substantially better than the industry’s as a whole. These trends are 
remarkable and should arouse the suspicion of auditing students. 
Other disturbing trends are evident in Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 demon- 
strates the rapid improvement in ~iniscribe’s gross margin percentage in 
1986, after the fraudulent reporting activities began. Figure 4 illustrates an 
alarming change in the relationship between accounts receivable and net 
sales. Prior to Wiles’ management, both sales and receivables were increas- 
ing moderately. The increase in both accounts was approximately equal, 
with sales increasing slightly faster than accounts receivable. A dramatic 
reversal in this relationship occurred after Q. T. Wiles took control of 
MiniScribe late in 1985. Both accounts showed large increases, with ac- 
counts receivable growth now exceeding sales growth. At times, the ac- 
counts receivable growth rate exceeded the sales account growth rate by 
over 100%. Such a relationship raises questions concerning the validity of 
net sales. 
Students must be warned that the presence of the foregoing red flags does 
not guarantee the discovery of irregularities. The MiniScribe fraud was a 
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Figure 3. Gross margin percent, 1982 to 1987. 
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Figure 4. Percent change in accounts, accounts receivable to sales. 
case of extensive management collusion, false documentation, and fraudu- 
lent financial reporting. Under these circumstances, the auditor may find 
plausible, but inaccurate, reasons for the deviations from expected values. 
It is quite possible, for example, that auditing students would rationalize 
that the aggressive, results-oriented management style of Mr. Wiles lends 
credibility to the rapid changes in quantitative factors noticed here. How- 
ever, when students consider the qualitative factors in tandem with the 
quantitative APs, they may view the situation with greater skepticism and 
may find the foregoing quantitative evidence to be more plausible. 
Qualitative Analysis 
At this point in the case, students should have fully evaluated the quanti- 
tative APs, as well as have an understanding of Mr. Wiles’ reputation for 
turning poor performance companies around. The instructor, depending on 
time constraints and/or level of course, may select three options for teach- 
ing the qualitative section of the case. Instructors teaching a standard three- 
semester-hour undergraduate course may wish to use only the qualitative 
factors from SAS No. 53 found in Table 4. Graduate courses, or those who 
wish to allot more time, can use the Loebbecke-Willingham Model pre- 
sented in Table 3, A third and more fulfilling option is to present both 
models, but give the student only some of the actual red flags from each list. 
This option can eliminate time-constraint problems, allowing the student to 
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focus on a few key red flags. It also allows the instructor to rotate the use of 
red flags, thus changing the case parameters during semesters with multiple 
sections of the auditing course. 
For completeness, the second option incorporating both SAS No. 53 
qualitative factors as well as the more comprehensive model proposed by 
LEW are used in the following analysis. Given both sets of factors, a 
student should be able to detect the need for further investigation in the 
case. 
SAS No. 53 
The student can now be given Table 4 identifying the 16 risk factors (red 
flags) from SAS No. 53 that, when combined with quantitative APs, may 
heighten the student’s skepticism that the financial statements contain mate- 
rial irregularities. After a brief discussion of the 16 factors, the instructor 
should supply Table 6, containing the 11 red flags present in the MiniScribe 
Table 6. SAS No. 53 and the MiniScribe Corporation 
Management characteristics 
Are management operating and financing deci- 
sions dominated by a single person? 
What is management’s attitude toward financial re- 
porting? 
suggested = 5 present = 4a 
Yes, Q. T. Wiles. 
Unduly aggressive. 
Is management (particularly senior accounting per- Yes, several controllers either 
sonnel) turnover high? quit or were fired. 
Does management place undue emphasis on meet- Yes, and some of the projections 
ing earnings projections? were unrealistic. 
Operating and industry characteristics 
What is the entity’s profitability relative to its indus- 
try? 
suggested = 6 present = 5a 
Inconsistently high. 
What is the rate of change in the industry? 
Is the direction of change in the entity’s industry de- 
clining with many business failures? 





Are there internal or external matters that raise sub- 
stantial doubt about the entity’s ability to con- 
tinue as a going concern? 
Yes. MiniScribe was near bank- 
ruptcy in 1985, and had sub- 
sequently lost its major cus- 
tomers. 
Engagement characteristics 
Are there significant difficult-to-audit transactions 
or balances present? 
Were there known or likely misstatements detected 
in the audit of prior periods’ financial state- 
ments? 
suggested = 5 present = 2” 
Yes, shipments in transit and ma- 
jor just-in-time customers 
created cutoff problems. 
Yes. In 1986 management at- 
tempted to book a freighter 
shipment at year-end that 
did not exist. 
“Summary of red flags suggested in SAS No. 53 and red flags present in the MiniScribe 
case. 
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case. The case contains significant numbers of red flags relating to manage- 
ment characteristics, operating and industry ~b~a~ter~stjcs, and engage- 
ment characteristics. Thus, all three categories of risk suggested by SAS 
No. 53 are represented. The list of red flags shown in Table 6 should 
heighten professional skepticism and, at a minimum, indicate a need for 
further investigation in carrying out the fieldwork. After reviewing the red 
flags, the student should focus on at least the following key questions: 
1. What effect does the presence of these red flags have on the evaluation 
of control and inherent risk’? Here, the instructor must stress qualita- 
tive factors that suggest weaknesses in MiniScribe’s internal control 
structure such as “management operating and financing decisions are 
dominated by one person”and “the organization is decentralized with- 
out adequate monitoring.” Inherent risk factors including “rapid rate 
of industry change” dso exist. Both of these risk components increase 
the chance that misstatements will occur and go undetected by the 
company’s internal control structure. 
2. What effect does the quantitative AP results have on the evaluation of 
audit risk? The quantitative APs show deviations that are materially 
different from both the expected account balances and industry aver- 
ages. Audit risk is increased when auditor expectations materially dif- 
fer from actual account balances. Further investigation through an 
increase in substantive testing may be required to reduce overall audit 
risk to an acceptable level. 
3. What insights do the quahtative factors offer when evaluating quanti- 
tative AP results? quantitative APs do not answer the question “why,” 
but signal what should be examined. For example, the quantitative 
APs show large increases in sales and accounts receivable that are 
materially different from expectations. The validity of these increases 
is questionable due to inconsistencies that are clearly evident when 
MiniScribe’s results are evaluated relative to industry profits and a 
general decline in the industry. 
4. When examining both quantitative and qualitative rest&s in tandem, 
what is the effect on detection risk and the need to gather any addi- 
tional evidence? Students should realize the need to increase substan- 
tive testing in order to decrease detection risk, compensating for the 
increase in both inherent and control risk. However, there is a limit to 
the amount by which detection risk can be reduced in order to achieve 
an acceptable audit risk. At some point, the financial statements be- 
come unauditable. 
Past experience has shown that student group discussions followed by 
open class discussion works best to fully exploit the case benefits. The 
instructor should facilitate the discussion by acting as a “devil’s advocate,” 
or by taking the part of Mr. Wiles giving plausible explanations for his 
company’s financial statement results. 
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Loebbecke-Willingham Model 
The instructor may repeat the above process with the Loebbecke- 
Willingham model, or combine both sources of red flags into one activity 
to avoid time constraints. The student should be supplied with the complete 
model from Table 3, as well as the results described in Table 7. The Loeb- 
becke-Willingham model, as revised by LEW, identifies 36 specific red flags 
that should enhance the student’s understanding of the cause of unexpected 
changes in the account balances and ratios observed in the quantitative 
analysis. Table 7 shows that 23 of the 36 red flags in the LEW risk assessment 
model are present in the case. Each of the three categories in the LEW 
model-conditions that a material management fraud could be committed, 
management motivation to commit a fraud, and attitude of management to 
commit a fraud-are significantly represented in the MiniScribe case. Once 
again, the findings should clearly indicate a need for further investigation in 
Table 7. Red flags in the Loebbecke-Willingham model 
directly relating to MiniScribe Corporation (C = Condition; 
M = Motivation; A = Attitude) 
Management operating and financial decisions are dominated by a single per- 
son or a few persons who generally act in concert. 
The company has entered into one or an aggregation of transactions that 
have a material effect on the financial statements. 
The company has a weak control environment. 
There are accounts that are material to the financial statements for which ex- 
tensive judgment is involved in determining the balance. 
Management turnover is high. 
Organization is decentralized without adequate monitoring. 
There are inadequacies in the company’s accounting system. 
The client’s industry is declining with many business failures. 
The rate of change in the industry is rapid. 
Profitability relative to the industry is inadequate or inconsistent. 
Compensation arrangements are based on recorded performance. 
Management places undue emphasis on meeting earnings projections. 
There are adverse conditions in the client’s industry. 
Management personnel perceive their jobs are threatened by poor perfor- 
mance. 
Management displays a propensity to take undue risks. 
There have been instances of irregularities in prior years. 
Management has lied to the auditor or has been overly evasive. 
Management displays an overly aggressive attitude toward financial report- 
ing. 
The client places undue pressure on the auditor. 














Summary of red flags suggested in the above model and red flags present in the Mini- 
Scribe case: 
C M A 
Suggested in the model 
Red flags present in the 
case 
13 11 12 
7 8 8 
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carrying out the audit. Again, with the instructor acting as a “devil’s advo- 
cate,” the above questions from the SAS No. 53 section should be discussed. 
After allowing time for discussion, the instructor may wish to demon- 
strate the strength of the signals obtained from qualitative analysis. For 
example, the students can be directed to consider three of the red flags in 
the Loebbecke-Willingham model: (1) compensation arrangements are 
based on recorded performance, (2) management personnel perceive their 
job is threatened by poor performance, and (3) profitability relative to the 
industry is inadequate or inconsistent. The MiniScribe management reward 
system placed undue emphasis on achieving sales and income targets, and 
loss of employment was threatened if targeted levels were not met. Sales 
and net income trends were clearly inconsistent with what was happening in 
the rest of the industry as shown in Figures 1 and 2. An auditor may 
interpret items (1) and (2) above as relatively benign given that these prac- 
tices are not uncommon in industry. Nonetheless, the undue emphasis on 
these items along with the inconsistency between MiniScribe’s profitability 
and that of the rest of the industry should signal a strong likelihood of 
account misstatements. In addition, the internal control environment at 
MiniScribe was weak, whiIe management adopted an aggressive attitude 
toward financial reporting. The presence of these factors at MiniScribe and, 
in particular, the significant deviation of post-1986 changes in the accounts 
receivable to sales ratio from the pre-1986 ratio should have prompted a thor- 
ough examination of unusual sales and receivable activities. 
Although the auditor’s judgment, given the situation, is the best guide in 
determining the appropriate action, students should be encouraged to de- 
velop logical decision rules for processing the multitude of red flags that 
will be encountered in the analysis. After presenting the student with the 
qualitative factors from Tables 6 and 7, the instructor should direct the 
students’ discussion towards if and how the new information affects their 
earlier risk assessment based on the quantitative analysis. The discussion 
should emphasize the need for and amount of additional substantive test- 
ing, the assigned risk level of the audit, and the reasoning that supports 
their conclusions. Students should be encouraged to blend both the quanti- 
tative and qualitative factors, thereby fully utilizing the tandem approach. 
Finally, the instructor needs to remind students that, even though APs 
may indicate the possibility of management fraud, the auditor is not as- 
sured of finding the actual cause of the misstatement. A misstatement may 
not even actually exist. Nonetheless, the use of quantitative APs in conjunc- 
tion with qualitative analysis provides the auditor and student a judgement 
tool for improving their ability to detect management fraud. 
The Fraud 
Many of the positive financial results were fraudulently fabricated by the 
firm’s management in order to appease Mr. Wiles’ “motivation” strategies, 
These tactics included both economic rewards for meeting unrealistic sales 
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levels and intimidation or loss of employment for failure to meet Wiles’ 
objectives. Key employee reorganization and turnover were common as 
Wiles maintained tight control over all of MiniScribe’s major decisions. 
Compounding the problem, several key employees responsible for finance 
and budgetary decisions lacked the training or experience needed to make 
sound decisions (MiniScribe Form 8-K, 1989). 
Some of Miniscribe’s fraudulent activities, included: 
1. the recording of an unordered $9 million shipment as a sale; 
2. underrecording sales returns by 1 ,SOO%; 
3. the recording of F.G.B. destination shipments as sales on the date of 
shipment; 
4. the recording of nonexistent shipments as sales; 
5. breaking into the auditor’s trunks to falsify inventory records; 
6. overshipments to customers exceeding $100 million; 
7. simply falsifying inventory and sales records; and 
8. several senior management personnel unlawfully sold a total of 
323,051 shares of MiniScribe common stock at artificially high prices, 
while in possession of material nonpublic information about Mini- 
Scribe’s true financial condition. 
The bulk of the MiniScribe management fraud occurred under the steward- 
ship of then CEO and major investor, Q. T. Wiles, during the fiscal years 
of 1986, 1987, and midway through 1988. Among the senior management 
personnel named in the fraud were: Patrick Schleibaum, Chief Financial 
Officer; Steven Wolfe, CPA, Controller; Kenneth Huff, CPA; Warren 
Perry, Executive Vice President; and Gerald Goodman, Director and Presi- 
dent of the company. The following excerpt from the enforcement release 
issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 1991, p, 13) 
provides additional insight into the extent of fraudulent activities at Mini- 
Scribe: 
In 1986 certain of the defendants took various steps to conceal a $4 to $4..% 
million inventory shortfall. . . . Among other things, defendants Perry and 
Wolfe, with the approval of defendants Schleibaum and Huff, broke into 
MiniScribe’s auditor’s trunks to obtain copies of the list of inventory items 
that had been test-counted by the auditors, so that they could inflate the 
number of high-value inventory items that the auditors had not sampled. 
At the end of September 1987, certain of the defendants took various 
steps to conceal an inventory shortfall of approximately $15 million. The . . . 
cover-up scheme had several major components: (a) creating fictitious inven- 
tory in transit; (b) transferring $9 million of nonexistent inventory from Mini- 
Scribe’s United States books to the books of MiniScribe’s Far East subsidiar- 
ies, and creating a corresponding amount of fictitious inventory in the Far 
East; and (c) receiving raw materials into inventory must prior to the end of 
the fiscal year without recording the corresponding accounts payable liability. 
. * . Certain of the defendants created fictitious inventory by shipping boxes 
of bricks labeled as disk drives to two of MiniScribe’s distributors and created 
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a computer program called “Cook Book” to generate fictitious inventory 
numbers. 
The fraud continued in 1988. Throughout 1988, the company, among other 
things, accumulated scrap that had been written off the company’s books, 
and, instead of discarding it, repackaged it and counted it as good inventory. 
. . . Employees prepared false inventory tickets to increase recorded inven- 
tory. From May 1985 through fiscal year 1987, defendants Wiles, Goodman, 
Schleibaum and Wolfe implemented a policy of managing MiniScribe’s re- 
ported earnings. . . . Through this policy, MiniScribe deliberately under- 
stated profits by overstating certain reserves during 1985 and the first two 
quarters of fiscal 1986, in order to provide a cushion of reserves that they 
could use to project an image of steady growth. . . . These cushions were 
used during subsequent periods of slower growth to pad earnings and con- 
tinue the appearance of steady growth. 
By January 1, 1990, MiniScribe had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
Their reported net worth of $145 million was actually a negative $171 
million. In April, 1990, Maxtor Corp won a $46 million bid in cash and 
stock to acquire the assets of MiniScribe. Maxtor named the new unit that 
resulted from the acquisition Maxtor Colorado Corp. 
Numerous lawsuits were filed by the bondholders, stockholders, and 
other creditors against the external auditors, audit committee members, 
and Wiles. A jury initially awarded a $568 million judgement against the 
auditors, Coopers & Lybrand, and the California investment firm, Ham- 
brecht & Quist. This award was subsequently set aside by the courts, and a 
lower settlement was reached. U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Charles Matheson 
subsequently approved an agreement by Coopers & Lybrand, whose share 
of the original $568 million judgement was $200 million, to pay $95 million 
to settle claims against the firm. The Wall Street Journal (April 16, 1992, 
Sec. A, p. 4) later reported that Coopers eventually paid between $45 mil- 
lion to $50 million, or 10% of its net worth, to settle a Texas bondholder 
suit against the firm. Colorado regulators, on July 7, 1992, fined the Den- 
ver office of Coopers & Lybrand $250,000 for its faulty audits, including 
the failed audit of MiniScribe. Attorneys representing MiniScribe investors 
were paid up to $7 million in legal fees for their involvement in the case. In 
March, 1993, Q. T. Wiles, the former CEO, was indicted on federal securi- 
ties and wire fraud for his role in the MiniScribe fraud. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper shows that a tandem approach that uses both quantitative 
APs and qualitative environmental factors may be used to help students 
assess the risk of management fraud in a real-world setting. Evaluation of 
qualitative factors exposes students to a richer interpretation of the signals 
given by quantitative APs, and incorporation of exogenous information 
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such as industry averages and general business conditions adds rigor to the 
analysis. Classroom exposure to cases such as MiniScribe offers students 
the opportunity to see how APs may be realistically applied in the audit 
process. Moreover, the use of such cases avoids the problem of jumping 
from one technical area to another without “planting in the [student’s] mind 
a seed of any of the larger questions” (Zeff, 1980, p. 660). The proposed 
case ap_ roach also encourages the development of broad problem-solving 
skills, qualitative judgment, and the evaluation of risk. The type of applica- 
tion suggested here should challenge students to obtain and use information 
from multiple sources under conditions that approximate the real-world. 
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